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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) there has been an ongoing argument in the
economic profession about the consequences of fiscal impulses.1 Not only the strength but also the
sign of the short-term response of output to fiscal impulses are subjects of debate. An important
controversy concerns the issue of whether and by which conditions the so-called ’non-Keynesian’
effects of fiscal policy emerge. The outburst of the global financial crisis and subsequent fiscal crises
in some advanced economies have intensified that debate.
This article contributes to the discussion by analyzing the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal
impulses using panel data for the EU New Member States (NMS) from 1995-2011. The main re-
search question concerns the preconditions for expansionary fiscal adjustments and contracionary
fiscal stimuli which we call non-standard effects of fiscal impulses.2 We do resign from calling those
effects ’non-Keynesian’ because we consider the conventional division of the effects of fiscal impulses
into Keynesian and non-Keynesian to be rather imprecise. Even according to the simplest textbook
Keynesian model (that is, the Samuelson model), fiscal adjustment may boost aggregate demand
and fiscal stimulus may dampen it when provided with the appropriate impulse composition.
Our motivation to focus on the NMS was twofold. Firstly, the European Union membership and
the perspective of joining the euro-area imposed more discipline on fiscal policy in those countries.
Most of them have also made large efforts to consolidate their public finances after the outburst of
the global financial crisis. Hence, the period we study provides us with a sufficient number of fiscal
impulse cases of various composition and size. However, there is still relatively little research on the
effects of fiscal impulses in those countries. Secondly, despite large fiscal adjustments undertaken
after the outburst of global financial crises, in most NMS fiscal the deficits are still higher than in
the pre-crisis period. Thus, the question of which fiscal adjustments may be least detrimental to
the economic performance in the short term is of great practical importance.
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature.
The first is the approach to solve the problem of endogeneity between growth and fiscal impulses,
which is a key point of any empirical work on the topic analyzed in this article. It is clear that,
while changes in fiscal balance may affect GDP growth, economic conditions are also important
determinants of both government spending and revenues. Having that in mind, one should look
for a proxy for a fiscal stance that is exogenous to GDP growth. We have counted more than six
different approaches widely used in the literature to cope with this problem. The results often differ
substantially depending on the particular method.3 As opposed to the majority of existing studies
we do not use a single method to identify fiscal impulses but apply four different methods so as to
test the robustness of the obtained results. Moreover, to our best knowledge this is the first article
on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal impulses which use the underlying fiscal balance (UB) as one
of the methods. This is also the first attempt to apply the ’action-based’ method proposed by the
IMF (2012) to the NMS.
Second, we do study the effects of fiscal impulses while other studies usually focus either on fis-
1We define fiscal impulse as a discretionary change in the fiscal balance. Fiscal adjustment is a discretionary
improvement of that balance, while fiscal stimulus consists of its discretionary deterioration.
2Fiscal adjustment is expansionary if it causes an increase in aggregate demand and output already in the short
term. Fiscal stimulus is contractionary if it leads to a fall in aggregate demand and output in such a horizon.
3Yet researchers come up with different and often contradictory results even when using the same methods for
identification of fiscal impulses. In searching for an explanation of those differences, one may indicate different
datasets studied, different methods of analysis applied (descriptive statistics versus econometric studies or DSGE
models) or, in the case of econometric studies, a different set of control variables.
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cal adjustments (most often) or on fiscal stimuli (less frequently). Analyzing both types of fiscal
impulses simultaneously raises the number of episodes studied and thereby improves the accuracy
of the estimates obtained. At the same time such an approach allows one to draw more general
conclusions about the role of the so-called ’ fiscal space’ to stabilize the economy.
Third, the response of the output to fiscal impulses is only a starting point in our analysis. Next,
we analyse the response of various output components. Most studies do not undertake that step,
which we consider helpful in evaluating various channels indicated as leading to a possible output
expansion after fiscal adjustment or to an output contraction after fiscal stimulus. Yet, as distinct
from almost all other studies, we go one step further and directly investigate the cost channel (i.e.
the effect of fiscal impulses on the labor costs share in GDP) and the expectations channel (i.e. the
reaction of consumer expectations to the fiscal impulses).
Fourth, we analyze the NMS whose experience is still under-researched whereas most of the existing
papers focus on advanced economies.
The main conclusion from the analysis is that the composition of fiscal impulses is crucial for their
effects. We find that expenditure-based adjustments (stimuli) are rather neutral to GDP growth
but they tend to be associated with investment and export growth acceleration (deceleration), even
in the short term. On the contrary, tax-based adjustments (stimuli) seem to hamper (boost) GDP
growth. We do not find evidence that fiscal policy affects the behaviour of private consumption. We
directly investigate the cost channel and expectations channel and find that the former is of main
importance. Adjustments (stimuli) involving expenditure cuts lead to the improvement (deteriora-
tion) of country cost competetiveness, which is in line with the discussed results for investment and
export reaction to fiscal policy. By contrast we do not find evidence for the expectations channel.
The results presented above should be treated with caution because of the estimation problems
typical for panel data models, notably in the case of the limited number of available observations.
Nevertheless, they constitute further, even if only partial, support for the claim that non-standard
effects of fiscal impulses are possible.
The rest of the article is organized accordingly. In the second section, theoretical explanations of
expansionary fiscal adjustments and contractionary fiscal stimuli are systematized. In the third
section, we review the empirical research on the topic. In the fourth section we discuss the method-
ological aspects of the research and describe the results of the panel data analysis. Section five
summarizes the main conclusions.
2 Complementary theories
Models explaining the non-standard effects of fiscal impulses can be divided into two groups (see,
e.g. Alesina, 2010).4 The first group attributes the source of such effects to the concerns of private
agents about the government’s solvency. According to the models of the second group, these effects
may be caused by supply shocks induced by fiscal impulses.
According to the first type of explanation, both the strength and signs of output reaction to fiscal
impulses depend on the households’ expectations. In the aftermath of fiscal adjustment, households
may reach the conclusion that they have had overly-pessimistic expectations as to the course of
public expenditure and cumulative tax burdens. In that case, changes in expectations may result in
an increase in private expenditures that more than offset the direct negative impact of fiscal adjust-
ment on output. Output will grow, if, in the opinion of households, the adjustment considerably
4One may find a more detailed survey of the theory of the effects of fiscal impulses in Briotti (2005).
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raises the cumulative flow of disposable income in their horizon of utility maximization relative to
their previous expectations.
Hence, fiscal adjustment is more likely to be expansionary when public debt is high and growing. In
such circumstances households expect to be soon burdened with the repayment of accumulated debt
(see, e.g. Sutherland, 1995). Besides, when public debt is high and growing, a rise in taxation to a
level causing serious distortions is more likely (see, e.g. Blanchard, 1990). A sufficiently large fiscal
adjustment would dispel both of these concerns. Conversely, an increase in fiscal deficit hastens the
moment when fiscal policy must be changed by accelerating the pace at which public debt grows
and thus strengthening the pessimistic expectations of households.
The influence of fiscal policy on aggregate demand may also depend on the level of public expendi-
ture to output ratio. If that ratio is low, then the increase in public expenditure is - to a considerable
degree - offset by the decrease of private consumption. Households are aware that the government
is unlikely to cut public expenditure until its financing becomes a problem; thus, they consider
the increase to be permanent. Each subsequent increase in government spending leads to an ever
weaker decrease of private consumption and, in effect, a stronger increase in aggregate demand.
This is due to the fact that the higher the level of current expenditure, the greater the proportion
of households considering the increase of public expenditure as temporary. If public expenditure
exceeds a certain threshold - and despite this is not reduced - households cease to believe in the
temporary nature of its previous increase. As the value of the cumulative tax burden expected
by households goes up sharply, households considerably reduce their consumption. In effect, the
increase of public expenditure is associated with a decrease of aggregate demand (see, e.g. Bertola
and Drazen, 1993). Thus, the failure to reduce the budget deficit may result in a sharp fall in
private consumption, leading to a decrease in aggregate demand.
According to the first type of explanation, fiscal impulses may also exert a non-standard impact
on output due to their influence on interest rates and thus, on the interest rate-sensitive private
expenditure - that influence being stronger than predicted in the standard Keynesian approach
(with regard to the latter see, e.g. Hicks, 1937). With public debt, there is always a risk that the
government will attempt to decrease its real value with higher inflation or that the government will
become insolvent or illiquid. That risk is reflected in the interest rate premium. When the state
of public finances raises households’ concerns, fiscal adjustment by the substantial decrease of the
previously high currency and country risk premium may crowd in private expenditure much more
strongly than in ’normal’ times (see, e.g. Miller, Skidelsky and Weller, 1990, or Costa Carvalho,
2009 who analyzes that channel in the DSGE framework). And the other way round, fiscal stimu-
lus in such conditions may very strongly crowd private expenditure out by further fueling the risk
premium.
Let us now turn to the second type of explanation. Fiscal impulses may cause supply shocks which
lead to changes in output, in particular by the impact on real wages. That kind of supply shock
spills over into the economy more quickly than other kinds of supply shock as it is more easily
recognized by economic agents.
The sign of shock depends on the composition of fiscal impulse. The deficit can be reduced either
by cuts in spending or through tax increases. Similarly, fiscal stimulus can consist in expenditure
increases or in tax reduction. Curbing expenditures, particularly on wages and salaries, or reducing
taxes ease the wage pressure in the economy while larger expenditures or higher taxes boost the
pressure. Wage moderation increases the price competitiveness of businesses in the international
market. The more open the economy, the more important the wage dynamics for the economic
performance of the country in question. Strengthened wage discipline may also raise enterprises’
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profits, which affect both their capacity and propensity to invest.5 Wage hikes due to higher wages
in the public sector or tax increases has precisely the opposite effect (see, e.g., Alesina et al, 1999
or Lane and Perotti, 2003).
To sum up: according to the first explanation, fiscal adjustment should be expansionary only if
the government faces the spectre of fiscal crisis and the adjustment is strong enough to stop the
growth of public debt. If, on the other hand, public debt growth is accelerated by fiscal stimulus,
it may prove to be contractionary due to a fear of the fiscal crises that it increases. In the second
explanation, the effects of fiscal impulse depend on its composition rather than its size or scale of
initial fiscal imbalances. However, it should be pointed out that these explanations are not mutually
exclusive - various mechanisms seem to be independent of each other. In that sense, contrary to
what is sometimes stated in the literature (see, e.g. Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000), different
views are not competing, but rather complementary.
3 Previous empirical studies
The experience of Denmark in 1983-1986 and Ireland in 1987-1989 triggered numerous empirical
research on the non-standard effects of fiscal impulses. The experience of these two countries was
thoroughly analysed in the seminal paper by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). Many more episodes
of expansionary fiscal adjustment or contractionary fiscal stimulus have since been identified and
discussed. As the next step, an analysis of the experiences of a wide group of countries has been
undertaken. At first, this analysis came down to quoting descriptive models which focused on the
issue of the persistence of fiscal adjustments (see, e.g. McDermott and Wescott, 1996). Gradually, as
more emphasis was put on estimating private consumption or investment equations, the researchers
were able to evaluate various channels that make fiscal adjustments expansionary or fiscal stimuli
contractionary. That evaluation started with estimations of single equations, constructed on an ad
hoc basis (see, e.g. Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 1999). Then the multi-equation approach, in the
form of the structural VAR framework, also began to be applied (among others in Perotti, 2002).
The global financial crisis and subsequent fiscal crises in some advanced economies triggered a new
wave of research on the effects of fiscal impulses. Notably, a DSGE framework has been extensively
used to show that fiscal multipliers exceeding one are possible when the central bank is constrained
by the zero lower bound (see, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2011; Eggertsson, 2009 or
2011, or Woodford, 2011). Yet even with the zero bound on interest rates, fiscal adjustment may be
expansionary and fiscal stimulus contractionary; if the fiscal impulse is sufficiently persistent (see,
e.g. Woodford, 2011, in particular Figure 3, or Cwik and Wieland, 2011), long-term interest rates
depend on the public debt level (see Costa Carvalho, 2009) or the liquidity trap is not caused by a
fundamental shock but by households’ pessimism (see, e.g. Mertens and Ravn, 2010).
One can draw the following conclusions from empirical studies on the non-standard effects of fiscal
impulses:
1. Fiscal adjustments are quite often followed by an acceleration in output growth. Giudice,
Turrini and in ’t Veld (2003) report that in Europe about half of the adjustments had this
feature. This acceleration is driven by both private consumption and investment. The growth
rate of the latter increases much more than that of the former (see, e.g. Alesina, Perotti
5A fall in real wage dynamics raises (ceteris paribus) capital remuneration but has no impact on the depreciation
of capital. Thus, the increase in capital remuneration is tantamount to a rise of the rate of return from an investment.
5
and Tavares, 1998 or Broadbent and Daly, 2010). The acceleration of investment growth is
preceded by an increase in the share of capital remuneration in the output (see e.g. Alesina
and Ardagna, 1998).
2. There is evidence suggesting that the change in interest rates is an important factor leading to
expansionary fiscal adjustments or contractionary fiscal stimuli. Alesina and Ardagna (2012)
show that central banks do lower interest rates in response to those fiscal adjustments which
are based on expenditure cuts. In turn, Baldacci and Kumar (2010) confirm that long-term
bond yields are to a significant extent determined by changes in the fiscal policy stance. The
relation is robust, nonlinear and dependent on the initial conditions (such as the public debt
level) or global factors (such as investors’ risk aversion or global bond supply). These results
are generally consistent with previous works (see, e.g. Engen and Hubbard, 2004 or Laubach,
2009).
3. Not only changes in interest rates matter for the effects of fiscal impulses. There is evidence
that supply-side polices, aimed at improving country cost competitiveness, can help mitigate
or even eliminate the output fall in response to fiscal adjustments (see, e.g. Perotti, 2011 or
Alesina and Ardagna, 2012).
4. Fiscal adjustments are more likely to be expansionary and fiscal stimuli - contractionary
in open economies rather than in closed ones, or at least fiscal multipliers are lower in the
former than in the latter economies (see, e.g. Hemming, Mahfouz and Schimmelpfennig, 2002
or Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Ve´gh, 2011).
5. Adjustments are expansionary mainly when the external economic conditions are favorable
(see, e.g. McDermott and Wescott, 1996). That does not mean that expansionary fiscal
adjustments are epiphenomena (it may suggest, with the two previous conclusions, the im-
portance of the export channel) but calls for a careful control of those conditions. By contrast,
an unfavorable domestic economic situation in the period preceding fiscal adjustment does not
present an obstacle to the expansionary effect of adjustment (see, e.g. Alesina and Perotti,
1996) and may even favour it (see, e.g. Segura-Ubiergo, Simone and Gupta, 2006). That
stands in sharp contrast to the claim, now quite popular (see, e.g. DeLong and Summers,
2012), that when capacity utilization is low, fiscal adjustment has to be strongly contrac-
tionary and fiscal stimulus very expansionary. Adjustments started under bleak domestic and
external circumstances are more often based on expenditure reduction and more persistent
than adjustments occurring in favorable conditions (see, e.g. von Hagen and Strauch, 2001).
6. It follows from most studies that fiscal adjustments are more often expansionary when they
are lasting (see, e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1996) and large (see, e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano,
1996). Some of those studies point out that the non-standard effects of fiscal impulses are
more frequent when public debt is high (see, e.g. Bhattacharya, 1999 or Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Ve´gh, 2011) or fast growing (see, e.g. Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000), rather than
low and slowly growing.
7. Fiscal adjustments are more lasting and more often expansionary if they are based on the
curtailment of expenditures rather than on tax increases (see, e.g. Alesina, Perotti and
Tavares, 1998 or Tsibouris et al., 2006). The difference in the effects of adjustments based
on expenditure cuts and tax hikes respectively cannot be explained by different monetary
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policies during the two types of fiscal adjustments, although those adjustments are followed
by different central bank’s reactions (see, e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 2012 or Alesina, Favero,
and Giavazzi, 2012). Some works find evidence in favor of tax increases, but they mainly
concern the response of private consumption to adjustment (see, e.g. Giavazzi, Jappelli and
Pagano, 1999) or stipulate that this conclusion refers to cases where large adjustments are
needed (see, e.g. Baldacci, Gupta, and Mulas-Granados, 2010).
8. The composition of fiscal adjustment is of far greater importance in terms of its consequences
than the size of the adjustment. Expansionary adjustments are usually focused on cuts in
wages, subsidies or transfers to households (see, e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1996; von Hagen,
Hughes Hallett, and Strauch, 2002 or Alesina and Ardagana, 1998 or 2010). However, as
far as only consumption (and thus the expectations channel) is concerned, the size of the
adjustment plays a crucial role (see, e.g. Giavazzi et al., 2005).
9. Most empirical studies analyse advanced economies. However, countries in transition seem
to be especially prone to experience the non-standard effects of fiscal impulses, in particular
because of the high level of uncertainty about their future fiscal position (see, e.g. Mulas-
Granados et al. 2002). The countries of this group often experienced a substantial duress
at debt levels that would be perceived easily manageable in advanced economies (see, e.g.
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003). Several descriptive analyses of fiscal policy in Central
European countries confirm that both the composition (see, e.g. Rzon´ca and Ciz˙kowicz, 2005
or Horva´th et al., 2006) and the size of adjustments (see, e.g. Segura-Ubiergo, Simone and
Gupta, 2006 or Neicheva, 2007) matter for output growth. Moreover, expenditure-based
adjustments proved to be more successful in debt reduction in those countries than tax-based
adjustments (see, e.g. Purfield, 2003) and than in advanced economies (see, e.g. Afonso,
Nickel and Rother, 2005).
In closing this section it should be emphasized that none of the aforementioned studies consider
the non-standard effects of fiscal impulses to be certain. In the literature, the view still prevails
that in response to fiscal adjustment output contraction is more plausible while output expansion
is more likely in response to fiscal stimulus. But then that response to fiscal impulses is mostly of a
modest scale. Most empirical studies on the effects of fiscal impulses indicate that the tax multiplier
hardly exceeds one-half and that of public expenditure hardly exceeds one (see, e.g., Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002; Hall, 2009; Barro and Redlick, 2009; Ramey, 2011 or Gechert and Will, 2012).
4 Econometric analysis
In this section we use panel data estimation to verify if fiscal impulses in the NMS from 1995-
2010 caused non-standard effects. First, we briefly describe the methods we use to identify fiscal
impulses. Next, we present the data, the specification of the equations and estimation techniques
used. Lastly, we provide results of the estimation.
4.1 Fiscal impulses
To isolate fiscal impulse changes in the budget balance has to be corrected for effects of cyclical
fluctuations in macroeconomic variables. There are several ways of achieving this.
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The most popular is the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB). The CAPB is used as the
main indicator of the fiscal policy stance by international institutions such as the OECD or the
European Commission. In this article we apply the CAPB with the output gap calculated using the
production function approach as it is better anchored in economic theory than an approach based
on filters (like Hodrick-Prescott). Nevertheless, this choice reduces the number of observations as
output gap data, according to the production function method, are not always available.
The CAPB method, although conceptually simple and giving comparable results across countries,
should be used with caution, as noticed by the IMF (2010) and, a few years before, e.g. by
Girouard and Andre´ (2005). Thus, in this article we also use the underlying fiscal balance (UB),
whose concept was developed in Joumard et al. (2008). It is the CAPB corrected for changes in
net capital transfers that stands for a proxy of government one-off transfers. Such a correction is
easy to apply and ensures consistency in the identification of one-offs across time and countries.6
The third method we use in this article is a method based on a simplified growth accounting
proposed by von Hagen (2002). This approach (HAGEN) does not require estimates of government
spending or tax elasticities and potential GDP. This feature is very important if one analyzes
countries that have undergone economic transition and have not completed enough business cycles
to provide reliable estimates of those elasticities. However, one has to stress that this method
may be oversimplified as it assumes that aggregate government expenditures and revenues react to
business cycle fluctuations in the same way across countries.
We also attempt to use a fourth, ’action-based’ (AB) method proposed by the IMF (2010).7 It
concentrates on actions (legislation changes) implemented in order to change the fiscal balance
regardless of recorded changes in balance. That allows for identifying fiscal impulses ex ante, not ex
post, as in the case of other methods. However, the method has at least three serious drawbacks.
First, it implicitly assumes that economic agents make decisions based on the government’s plans
rather than on the observed effects of the actions, although governments tend to withdraw or modify
their plans along the budget year. These modifications may be caused not only by the unpredicted
economic development (which would lead to bias when using ex post impulse measures) but also by
social pressure or erroneus preliminary estimates of the reform’s effects. Second, it also ignores that
some channels, making the effects of fiscal impulses non-standard, work due to actual rather than
announced changes: e.g. labor supply is likely to increase after a reduction in transfers to households
rather than after the anouncement of such a reduction. Third, it raises a lot of discretion as it is rare
that detailed and coherent data on the planned effects of fiscal actions and policy-makers’ intentions
behind them are reported on an annual basis. That problem is particularly severe in the case of
emerging economies. Due to the absence of appropriate data we are not able to strictly follow the
methodology proposed by the IMF. However, in order to account for the IMF critique of standard
measures of fiscal impulses, we propose a ’reduced’ version of the action-based approach. Instead
of identifying the exact size of planned deficit changes related to actions taken by governments we
create a variable that takes values in a set −1; 0; 1, where -1 stands for fiscal stimulus, 0 means that
6Another step to improve CAPB reliability would be to adjust it to balance changes driven by asset prices
movements: the effect not considered in CAPB estimates provided by the OECD or the EC (see, e.g. Tagkalakis,
2009). The problem seems to be on the researchers’ agenda (see, e.g. Morris and Schuknecht, 2007), and the
IMF recently started publishing data on structural fiscal balance, i.e. CAPB adjusted for the impact of asset price
movement. Unfortunately, the data for NMS countries is still too scarce to apply the concept of structural fiscal
balance in this paper. It is worth noting that even if corrected for one-offs and asset prices changes, the CAPB
may fail to provide accurate estimate of fiscal stance in the periods in which values of certain taxes or expenditure
elasticities differ from these estimated for ’normal’ times.
7See also Devries et al. (2011).
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no notable action was taken, and 1 accounts for adjustments.8 In the next step, we compare our
reduced AB impulses with the recorded changes in UB to find the episodes in which both methods
give the same qualitatative result. Finally, in regression analysis we test if there is a difference in the
reaction of macroeconomic variables to changes in the fiscal stance measured by UB depending on
their consistency with our reduced AB impulses.9 If such a difference was found, it would support
the claim of the IMF that using an AB approach may lead to different conclusions about the effects
of fiscal policy when compared to standard ’mechanical’ approaches.
4.2 Data
We use panel data recorded on an annual basis for the EU New Member States (i.e. Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia)
from 1995-2011. Relevant data is obtained from a variety of sources. Most of the data, especially
national accounts, unemployment rates and fiscal data (including CAPB estimates) are taken from
the European Commission’s AMECO database. To calculate UB impulses according to the method
proposed by Joumard et al. (2008) AMECO data on capital transfers is used. Data concerning
consumper prices, labour productivity and share of labour compensation in GDP originate from the
Eurostat database. In case of labour share and consumer prices several missing observations were
filled with corresponding OECD and WB data. Information on households condifdence indicators
were extracted from consumer surveys published by European Commission. A detailed description
of each variable used can be found in the appendix. The data do not cover the whole period for all
countries, hence the estimated models are based on an unbalanced panel.
In using annual data we follow the example given by Corsetti, Meier and Mu¨ller (2012). They
argue that fiscal policy response to changes in economic conditions on a quarterly basis is quite
rare and even then restricted to tax measures. Indeed, as shown by Born and Mu¨ller (2012), the
hypothesis that government expenditure does not react to changes in other variables within a year
cannot be rejected. However, the main reason why we do not base regressions on quarterly data
is the scarcity of such data and its questionable quality for analyzed countries: namely, quarterly
estimates of CAPB and UB are not available for them.
4.3 Specification of Equations
In order to validate the theoretical possibility of the occurrence of expansionary fiscal adjustments
and contractionary fiscal stimuli we, at first, estimate the effect of fiscal impulses on GDP growth.
In our regression specification we include both current and lagged fiscal impulse as suggested by
Alesina and Ardagna (2012). Rational for such a lag structure is the focus on the short, rather
than the long-term impact of fiscal impulses on output growth.10 Then we introduce lagged real
8In cases where we were able to obtain estimates of the planned budgetary effect of an action, we coded our
impulse variable in the following way: 1 (-1) if the adjustment (stimulus) accounted for no less than 0.5% GDP, and
0 in the remaining cases. To arrive with data on the reduced AB impulses we used the information from the OECD,
IMF, EC surveys and other available country reports.
9In fact our approach to AB impulses allows us to avoid the possible truncation bias present in regressions using
original IMF estimates which result from coding all cases of fiscal adjustments and stimuli as 0 (problem noted in
Perotti, 2012).
10However, one has to stress that the possible output contraction in response to fiscal adjustment on impact and
after a 1 period delay should be followed by its expansion, if fiscal deficit is indeed costly in terms of output level (or
even its growth) in the steady state (see, e.g. Fischer, 1993; Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998, or Friedman, 2005). A
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GDP growth in order to capture the conventional persistence of this variable caused by the business
cycle.11 We also control the effects of changes in external conditions reflected in the growth rate of
the total real GDP in EU27 countries.12 Lastly, we add the artificial variable art exp distinguishing
between impulses relying on tax and government spending changes. The variable art exp is equal
to the impulse variable if the contribution of government expenditure reduction (increase) to fiscal
adjustment (stimulus) is greater than 50 percent and 0 otherwise. Additionally, for models with an
impulse identified as changes in UB we added the variable art ab ub taking the value of the impulse
when indications of UB and AB impulses are consistent and 0 in the opposite case.13
Hence, we estimate the following equation:14
gdpi,t = µ+ δ1 gdpi,t−1 + ρ1 gdp eu27i,t +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulsei,t−k +
k=1∑
k=0
γk art expi,t−k + αi + i,t
with additional term on RHS when UB impulses are used : +
k=1∑
k=0
φk art ab ubi,t−k (1)
where µ is intercept, gdp - real GDP growth, gdp eu27 - real total GDP growth in EU27 countries,
impulse - fiscal impulse (positive values for adjustments, negative for stimuli), art exp - artificial
variable that controls for composition of the impulse (spending versus tax based), art ab ub - ar-
tificial variable that accounts for possible differences between UB and AB impulses; variable α
represents a time-invariant, country-specific disturbance (individual effect) and  is a random noise.
Variables subscripts i and t mean - country number (from 1 to 10) and year (from 1 to 17) respec-
tively. If fiscal adjustments are expansionary and fiscal stimuli contractionary, then in equation 1 at
least one of the estimated coefficients βk should be positive and statistically significant. However,
the output response may also depend on the composition of the impulse. This effect should manifest
complete impulse response analysis would have to be carried out to answer the question of when the possible costs of
fiscal adjustments are outweighed by the long-term benefits. That question, although very fundamental, is beyond
the scope of our article which is restricted to the short term.
11Another reason is that lagged variables reduce the potential consequences of spurious regression outcomes as
suggested by Hamilton (1994).
12In general, one may want also a control for the stance of monetary policy by including a variable corresponding
to interest rate changes. However, the presented theory suggests that interest rates changes are one of the potential
channels for the occurrence of non-standard effects, so controlling them would not be appropriate here. Still, as
a robustness check we estimated our equations explaining the dynamics of GDP and its components with a real
short-term (3-month) interest rate added as a regressor. This does not change our basic results, which means
that the interest rate channel is not the main force behind the occurrence of expansionary fiscal adjustments and
contractionary fiscal stimuli.
13To be specific, we assume that AB and UB are mutually consistent in episodes where firstly, both impulses record
the fiscal actions of the same sign and the absolute value of UB impulse exceeds 0.5% GDP or secondly, according to
the AB approach no fiscal action was taken, while the absolute value of UB impulse is lower or equal to 0.5% GDP.
14We realize that the models presented in this subsection may seem oversimplified. However, the short timeframe
of the analyzed panel prevents us from using more sophisticated methods such as, for example, panel VAR models
or from including a greater range of explanatory variables. Even resorting to quarterly data (that is available for
most variables we consider from 1999) would not solve the problem. This would require deseasonalizing the fiscal
data which is clearly a difficult task as government revenues q-o-q changes depend not only on economic performance
but also on the tax collection legislation. Thus, changes in the share of certain taxes in total revenues, or changes
in legislated timing of tax collection, would affect seasonality patterns. These changes have been more frequent in
the NMS than in developed countries. Therefore, standard ”mechanical” deseasonalizing in the case of the NMS
could lead to unsatisfactory results. Existing VAR models estimated on quarterly data for single NMS countries are
plagued by a poor quality of estimates (manifesting itself in wide confidence intervals for IRF function) which do not
allow one to draw any strong conclusions (see, e.g. Franta, 2012 or Mirdala, 2009).
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itself by the sign (and significance) of γk parameters. To present the overall two-period impact of
an expenditure based impulse, we test linear restriction where β0 + β1 + γ0 + γ1 = 0. If the null
hypothesis is rejected and the obtained statistic proves positive, the result will be consistent with
the theory of expansionary fiscal adjustments and contractionary fiscal stimuli, described in Section
2. Finally, the negative values of φk would support the claim made by the IMF (2010) that mechan-
ical methods of identyfing impulses (in our case the UB approach) may be biased toward detecting
cases of expansionary fiscal adjustments when it is not justified. However, positive estimates of φk
would support the hypothesis that announced adjustments or stimuli are more likely to generate a
GDP response in line with the theory of the non-standard effects of fiscal impuses.
As the next step of the analysis we investigate the effect of fiscal impulses on various GDP com-
ponents. In that part of the analysis we follow the example given by Alesina and Ardagna (2012).
Most studies on expansionary fiscal adjustments do not undertake that step, although it is helpful
in evaluating various channels which may cause non-standard effects of fiscal impulses. If those
studies go beyond the analysis of output response to fiscal impulses, they merely describe the con-
tribution of various GDP components to its growth during adjustment episodes (see, e.g. Giudice,
Turrini and in ’t Veld, 2003) or focus on explaining the changes of a single component, that is of
consumption (see, e.g. Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000 or Bhattacharya and Mukherjee, 2013),
investments (see e.g. Alesina et al., 1999) or exports (see, e.g. Devries et al., 2011).
Firstly, we check the existence of the export channel since it gets the strongest support in previous
empirical studies, as surveyed in Section 3. If it really does operate, the reduction in fiscal deficit
through cuts in expenditures should boost exports more than a reduction obtained by tax increases.
The estimated equation has the following form:
exporti,t = µ+ λ1 exporti,t−1 + δ1 gdpi,t−1 + ρ1 imp eu27i,t +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulsei,t−k
+
k=1∑
k=0
γk art expi,t−k + αi + i,t
with additional term on RHS when UB impulses are used : +
k=1∑
k=0
φk art ab ubi,t−k (2)
The set of control variables is similar as in GDP growth regressions; however here instead of the
GDP growth rate we use the growth rate of imports in EU27 to capture the changes in external
economic conditions.15 If an export channel exists, the sum of impulse and art exp parameters
(both current and lagged) should be significantly larger than zero.
Secondly, to examine the existence of the private investment channel, we estimate the following
15We do not use current GDP growth as a control variable as it could lead to biased estimates because of reverse
causality - export is a component of GDP, so acceleration of its growth may translate into the acceleration of GDP
growth. For the same reason only lagged GDP growth is used in regressions explaining investment and consumption
growth. Moreover, as non-standard effects could operate through the exchange rate channel, we do not control for
this variable in our basic setting. Nevertheless, as an exercise we ran regressions of the equation 2 including real
exchange rate as a control variable and the obtained results remained in line with the ones presented in the paper.
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equation:
pinvi,t = µ+ λ1 pinvi,t−1 + δ1 gdpi,t−1 + ρ1 gdp eu27i,t +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulsei,t−k
+
k=1∑
k=0
γk art expi,t−k + αi + i,t
with additional term on RHS when UB impulses are used : +
k=1∑
k=0
φk art ab ubi,t−k (3)
where pinv stands for real growth of private investment. As in previous regressions we look not
only at parameters βk and γk but also test their joint significance assuming a null hypothesis of
linear restriction β0 + β1 + γ0 + γ1 = 0.
Thirdly, we explore the response of private consumption to fiscal impulses. To validate the hypoth-
esis according to which fiscal impulses should be lasting and large to accelerate rather than hamper
consumption growth, we include a new artificial variable in the regression - art high. It takes the
value of the fiscal impulse variable if the latter is among the 5% highest adjustments or 5% highest
stimuli in the sample, otherwise the variable is equal to zero.16 Hence, the regression specification
is as follows:
pconsi,t = µ+ λ1 pconsi,t−1 + δ1 gdpi,t−1 + ρ1 gdp eu27i,t +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulsei,t−k
+
k=1∑
k=0
γk art highi,t−k + αi + i,t
with additional term on RHS when UB impulses are used : +
k=1∑
k=0
φk art ab ubi,t−k (4)
where pcons is a real growth rate of private consumption and the control variables are as in the
previous equation. Once again we examine the overall two-period impact of the impulse by testing
the validity of the restriction β0 + β1 + γ0 + γ1 = 0.
The last step in our analysis is the direct investigation of the cost channel and expectations chan-
nel.17 As explained in Section 2, the former stands behind the export channel and contributes
to the investment channel, and the latter largely determines the reaction of consumption to fiscal
impulses. In the former case we draw from Alesina and Ardagna (2012), while in the latter from
Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2012). Surprisingly, almost all other studies on the effects of fiscal
impulses do not undertake that step.
16In existing literature it is popular to use fixed thresholds for the size of the impulse to recognize it as ”high”.
Typically, thresholds are set to 1.5% of the GDP (see, e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 2010 or the IMF, 2010). However,
applying this approach to our data sample leads to a problem of collinearity between impulse and art high variables.
Applying thresholds based on 0.05 and 0.95 data quantiles solves the problem.
17We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the suggestion to extend our analysis of this element.
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To verify the cost channel we estimate the following equation:
lab sharei,t = µ+ λ1 lab sharei,t−1 + δ1 lab prodi,t−1 + ρ1 gdp eu27i,t + ϕ unempi,t
+
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulsei,t−k +
k=1∑
k=0
γk art expi,t−k + αi + i,t
with additional term on RHS when UB impulses are used : +
k=1∑
k=0
φk art ab ubi,t−k (5)
where lab share is employee compensation as a share in the GDP. The growth rate of labour pro-
ductivity (lab prod) measured as GDP per person employed and the rate of unemployment (unemp)
are included to control for cyclical determinants of the dependent variable. In this specification, we
are especially interested in the impact of expenditure-based impulses (art exp) which, according to
the theories discussed in Section 2, are the driving force of the cost channel. If this channel works
then the sum β0 + β1 + γ0 + γ1 = 0 should be significantly larger than 0.
To analyze the expectations channel we estimate the following equation:
con expi,t = µ+ λ1 con expi,t−1 + δ1 gdpi,t−1 + ρ1 hicpi,t + ϕ unempi,t +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulsei,t−k
+
k=1∑
k=0
γk art highi,t−k + αi + i,t
with additional term on RHS when UB impulses are used : +
k=1∑
k=0
φk art ab ubi,t−k (6)
where con exp is a balance of the consumer confidence indicator at the end of the given year.18
In this regression we include the real GDP growth rate, the HICP inflation rate (hicp) and the
rate of unemployment in order to control for variables which are perceived by the households as
common indicators of the current economic situation and hence used as the basis for the formation
of expectations. As in previous regressions we include the artificial variable art ab ub to verify
if the discrepancies between impulses measured by the UB and AB approach could bias the re-
sults. According to the first of the explanations presented in Section 2, fiscal impulses have to
be sufficiently large in order to influence household expectations. Therefore, as in the case of the
consumption channel, not only do we include in the regression a fiscal impulse variable but also an
artifical variable identifying impulses of a large scale. As in the case of the consumption channel
we examine the overall two-period impact of the impulse by testing the validity of the restriction
β0 + β1 + γ0 + γ1 = 0.
4.4 Methodological issues
Estimation of the equations described in the previous subsection may pose several methodological
problems. Firstly, the equations are dynamic in nature so the standard panel data estimators like
fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) are biased. One way to tackle the problem is to apply
18We use indicators from European Commission surveys. Balance is, roughly speaking, the difference between a
percentage of respondents being optimistic about the economy and a percentage of respondents being pessimistic.
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an instrumental variables estimator - one proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) - the so-called
difference estimator, or the estimator proposed in Arellano and Bover (1995) - the so-called system
estimator. These estimators are asymptotically consistent, yet their properties may be unsatisfac-
tory in the case of short samples as our. As Kiviet (1995) pointed out, it is possible to correct the
bias of standard estimators without affecting their efficiency. In the article we apply a corrected
least square dummy variables estimator (LSDVC) following the procedure proposed by Bun and
Kiviet (2002) and then modified for the analysis of unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005). Secondly,
the reggresors used in the equations 1 - 6 may be exposed to an endogeneity problem. It is controlled
to some extent by using fiscal impulses rather than changes in the level of the general government
deficit; however, it may be insufficient to fully eliminate the endogeneity bias. Once more, a possible
solution is to apply the instrumental variables estimator. Again, the severe bias of this estimator
when applied to short samples prevent us from using it in this research. Thirdly, the abscence of
a sufficient number of observations makes it impossible to allow for the heterogeneity of structural
parameters. If the estimated parameters varied across countries, the standard approach would be
to separately estimate the model for each country with the OLS and average the parameters ob-
tained in such a way.19 In our case, each of the country-separate regressions would be based on -
at most - 17 observations, making the estimates clearly unreliable. The fourth problem that could
affect the results is possible cross-sectional dependence (or spatial correlation) of error terms. In
the model analyzed, this is equivalent to the assumption that there are unobserved time-varying
omitted common variables which impact individual states. If these unobservable common factors
are uncorrelated with the independent variables, the coefficient estimates based on OLS or FE
regression are consistent20 but standard error estimates are biased. Therefore, we use the Driscoll
and Kraay (1998) nonparametric covariance matrix estimator (DK) which corrects for the error
structure spatial dependence as well as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Taking into account all of the abovementioned restrictions, we use four types of panel data estima-
tors: fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), Driscoll-Kraay with corrected standard errors (DK)
and a biased-corrected least square dummy variable (LSDVC). Each of the equations presented in
the previous subsection is estimated in 12 different versions: namely for each of the three main
methods of impulse identification we apply four different estimators. At the same time, we do
realize that the obtained results could be affected by some of the abovementioned problems and
that the conclusions drawn on their basis should be taken with caution.
4.5 Estimation results
According to the approach presented in Subsection 4.3, we first estimate the impact of fiscal im-
pulses on GDP growth. Table 1 presents a range of estimates varying by the type of the applied
estimator and the method used to identify fiscal impulses. Regardless of the estimator, in the case
of impulses identified by the CAPB and the UB, the obtained GDP growth response to tax-based
fiscal impulses has a rather Keynesian flavor - the parameter related to the impulse variable is
negative and significant. However, the situation changes if one considers expenditure-based im-
pulses - in the case of all three, the main impulse identification methods coefficient of art exp is
significantly higher than 0 (with the weakest effect in the case of HAGEN and the strongest for UB,
19 This approach, called the ’Mean Group Estimator’, was first proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995).
20 If this is not the case, i.e. unobserved common-factors are correlated with independent variables, coefficient
estimates are inconsistent. One of the possible solutions is the Common Correlated Effects estimator proposed by
Pesaran (2006). Unfortunately, similarly to the Mean Group estimator, it requires a separate estimation of the model
for each country in the sample.
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where the coefficient is higher than 1 regardless of the estimator). Having in mind the potential
problems with the estimation and identification of the fiscal policy stance outlined in the previous
subsection, we argue that most of the attention should be paid to the DK and LSDVC estimates
with fiscal impulses calculated by the UB method. The estimated coefficients indicate that fiscal
adjustment (stimulus) by 1 percent of GDP, caused mainly by expenditure reduction (expenditure
increase), raises (lower) the output growth by about 0.55 p.p. in the same period. Still, this effect
is not statistically different from 0.
Meanwhile, the calculated total two-period impact of curbing (increasing) government expenditure
on GDP growth is positive for all estimators and impulses but in most cases not significantly dif-
ferent from 0. Thus, we find evidence that although the expansionary effects of adjustment are
unlikely to outweigh the contractionary ones, the total effect is much less negative in the case of
expenditure-based adjustments. The same logic may be applied to fiscal stimuli - the ones based
on tax cuts are much more effective in stimulating GDP growth than the ones involving mainly
increases of expenditures.
Apart from fiscal impulses, GDP growth is also affected by the changes in external conditions prox-
ied by the variable gdp EU27. Moreover, the dependent variable shows high inertia which may be
explained by the fact that including a lagged value of regressor allows one to account for factors
that are not changing rapidly in time (in the case of the GDP one may think of a regulatory envi-
ronment, or generally - institutions). Lastly, we do not find the evidence that an AB approach to
impulse identification should lead to results different from the ones with impulses identified by UB
changes. We elaborate on this later as this result is shared by most of the subsequent regressions.
Next, we focus on the effects of fiscal impulses on various GDP components. Firstly, we use equa-
tion 2 in order to examine the export channel. The main result we obtain (see Table 2) shows that
the composition of impulses has a significant impact on the growth of exports - the coefficient on
art exp is significantly larger than zero, regardless of the estimator used, when the impulse is identi-
fied by CAPB or UB. Conversely, the coefficients on the impulse are mostly negative but the result
is less robust than for art exp - they are statistically significant only for CAPB impulses (at a 5%
significance level). This suggests that fiscal adjustments based on tax reforms have a negative or, at
most, a neutral impact on export performance. The overall two-period effect of expenditure-based
fiscal adjustment (stimulus) on export growth seems to be expansionary (contractionary) if one
looks at UB impulse estimates - the statistics of a linear restriction test are positive and significant
on a 5 percent level for three out of the four estimators.
Secondly, using the empirical specification given by equation 3, we examine the investment chan-
nel. The results of the estimation (see Table 3) indicate that composition of fiscal impulses also
matter in this case. Tax-based fiscal adjustments (stimuli) have mostly negative (positive) but
not statistically significant effects on private investment growth (for CAPB and UB impulses). At
the same time, adjustments (stimuli) involving expenditure curtailment (expansion) are associated
with more (less) favourable outcomes in terms of investment growth when compared to tax-based
reforms. As in the export channel, the non-standard effects outweight the Keynesian ones if one
looks at the two-period impact of the impulses measured by UB - a fiscal adjustment (stimulus)
equal to 1 percent of the GDP contributes to an acceleration (deceleration) of private investment
growth over a period of 2 years by a cumulative 3.3-5.5 p.p., depending on the estimator used.
Thirdly, we estimate equation 4 in order to find evidence of a consumption channel (Table 4).
The obtained estimates indicate that there is no straightforward and significant relation between
private consumption growth and fiscal impulses. This manifests itself in coefficients on the current
impulse variable - they are positive but not significant. A similar result is seen for lagged impulse
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- the parameters are insignificant regardless of the estimator and impulse. The situation does not
change much if we consider only substantial adjustments/stimuli or the ones when both AB and
UB identification methods indicate the same pattern of fiscal stance changes. Lastly, the lack of a
significant relation between fiscal policy and the growth of consumption is confirmed for two-period
overall effects - the sum of the coefficients for impulse, art high and their lags is not statistically
different from 0 in all regressions.
So far we have established that the effects of fiscal impulses depend on their composition. Expenditure-
based adjustments (stimuli) are less likely to be associated with hampered (accelerated) GDP
growth rates than revenue-based ones. Behind that, the response of private investment and export
seems to be the most important for the result. Next ,we directly investigate the cost channel and
expectations channel.
Firstly, we estimate equation 5 to verify if there is any significant relation between labor cost (mea-
sured as labor share in the GDP) and fiscal impulses. We find that while tax-based impulses are
neutral to the behaviour of labor costs, expenditure-based adjustments (stimuli) lead to a decline
(rise) in the labor share in GDP (Table 5). The variable art exp is negative and significant in
most of the regressions. The result also holds for an overall two-period impact as the value of the
tested linear restriction is negative and statistically significant in most cases. Fiscal adjustment
that amounts to 1 percent of the GDP and involves mainly expenditure curtailment is associated
with an overall two-period reduction of labor share in the GDP by 0.19 - 0.47 p.p.
Secondly, we estimate equation 6 to validate the existence of the expectations channel, i.e. the
possibility that fiscal adjustments by their impact on future debt and taxation prospects improves
household confidence (Table 6). This channel should be crucial for the reaction of private consump-
tion to fiscal impulses as the cost channel is likely to operate mostly through investment and exports
performance. However, our result does not support the logic behind the expectations channel. Most
parameters of the variables impulse and art high (and their lags) are not significantly different from
0. What is still worth noting is that, unlike in previous regressions, there is a discrepancy between
the results for impulses measured by UB and AB. The parameters of ab ub imp are negative and
significant, which means that fiscal adjustments (stimuli) recorded by both UB and AB are more
contractionary (expansionary) than adjustments (stimuli) recorded by only one of the methods.21
This may be explained in two ways - either the UB is biased toward detecting adjustments (stimuli)
with a less negative (positive) impact on household confidence than AB, or agents believe that fiscal
adjustments (stimuli) are likely to be followed by a worsened (improved) economy’s performance
and form more pessimistic (optimistic) expecations after adjustments (stimuli) that were widely
announced.22
The results of the regressions discussed above share two common features worth noting. Firstly,
the effects of impulse composition are more visible when fiscal impulse is identified by UB instead
of CAPB. Expenditure-based impulses tend to have more likely non-standard effects in the case
of UB impulses than in the case of CAPB impulses. This suggests that previous analyses that
applied CAPB could be biased toward detecting larger fiscal multipliers than is actually the case.
Secondly, with the exception of the expectations channel, we do not find evidence that UB leads to
under-estimating fiscal multipliers when compared to the ’reduced’ AB approach. This is at odds
with the widely discussed results in the IMF (2010), where it was claimed that the CAPB method is
biased and should be replaced by AB approach to properly investigate the effects of fiscal impulses
21 And the second method pointing to the occurrence of fiscal stimuli (adjustments) or no policy change at all.
22 As a reminder, only announced adjustments are detected by AB while UB detects all actions that ended with
substantial changes in structural deficit.
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on GDP growth.23
To sum up, we confirm the results already established in the literature that the output response to
fiscal impulses depends on the composition of the latter. Although the expansionary effects of ad-
justment on GDP growth are unlikely to outweigh contractionary ones, the total effect is much less
negative in the case of expenditure-based adjustments. Fiscal adjustments driven by government
expenditure cuts tend to be accompanied by private investment and exports growth acceleration
and fiscal stimuli - by private investment and export growth deceleration. We also find that the
likely reason for these effects to occur is the cost channel - expenditure cuts improves a country’s
cost competitiveness, thereby contributing to the acceleration of export and investment growth,
while expenditure increases undermine that competitiveness. We do not find evidence in favor of
the existence of the expectations channel.
The conclusions from the analysis are broadly in line with the existing empirical research covering
the NMS. The literature often points to the importance of the impulse composition (e.g. Purfield,
2003, Afonso, Nickel and Rother, 2005 or Rzon´ca and Ciz˙kowicz, 2005). In this paper, we present
a more detailed picture - the total output response to fiscal policy is shaped mainly by the reaction
of investment and export which in turn depends on the composition of impulse. To our best knowl-
edge, this is so far the second paper (after Rzon´ca and Ciz˙kowicz, 2005) which investigates GDP
components response to fiscal impulses in the NMS.24 Moreover, we are the first to use new mea-
sures of fiscal impulses (i.e. UB and ’reduced’ AB impulses respectively) for the NMS. It allows us
to check the robustness of the results to the changes in the method applied for fiscal impulse identi-
fication, a topic that is receiving a lot of attention in many recent studies for developed economies.
Lastly, our research involves one of the first attempts to directly validate the existence of the cost
and expectations channels mentioned in the theory of non-standard effects of fiscal impulses.
4.6 Conclusions
In this article we have analyzed the effects of fiscal impulses in 10 NMS from 1995-2011. The main
conclusions from the analysis are as follows:
1. The most robust result is that the composition of the fiscal impulses is crucial for their effects.
We find that expenditure-based adjustments (stimuli) are rather neutral to GDP growth but
they tend to be associated with investment and export growth acceleration (deceleration).
On the contrary, tax based adjustments (stimuli) seem to hamper (boost) GDP growth.
2. We do not find evidence that fiscal impulses affect the behavior of private consumption,
regardless of their size.
3. It follows from the direct investigation of the cost and expectations channels that the former
is of main importance. Adjustments (stimuli) involving expenditure cuts lead to improvement
(deterioration) of country cost competitiveness, which is in line with the discussed results for
investment and export reaction to fiscal policy. By contrast we do not find any evidence for
the ’expectation’ channel which leaves a lack of clear consumption’s response to the fiscal
impulses unexplained.
23 Although we compare UB not CAPB to AB, one should note that a majority of the IMF’s theoretical arguments
against CAPB should also be valid for UB.
24 Compared to that work we use longer data series and a broader robustness check (with respect to the methods
used to identify fiscal impulses and estimators applied).
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4. We test the robustness of the results by comparing the relevant regression coefficients when
different methods to identify fiscal impulses are applied. We find that most of the results
remain qualitatively unchanged regardless of the impulse identification method used. The
effects of impulse composition are most visible when the concept of underlying fiscal balance
is used - the method we find the most reliable.
5. We take preliminary measures to apply an action-based approach to impulse identification
as proposed in the IMF (2010). We do not find evidence supporting the IMF’s claim that
mechanical methods used to identify fiscal impulses tend to underestimate fiscal multipliers.
Yet, one has to keep in mind that we use only a ’reduced’ version of an action-based approach.
The results should be treated with caution because of the estimation problems typical for panel
data models, notably in the case of the limited number of available observations. Nevertheless, they
constitute further, even if only partial, support for the claim that expansionary fiscal adjustments
and contractionary fiscal stimuli are possible.
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6 Data appendix
Variables presented in order as they appear in equations presented in section ’Econometric analysis’.
Variable Description Source Observations
gdp
Annual growth of real Gross Domestic Prod-
uct.
AMECO 170
gdp eu27
Annual growth of real Gross Domestic Prod-
uct in 27 European Union Countries (weighted
average of country growth rates with weights
corresponding to share of country GDP in to-
tal EU27 GDP).
AMECO 170
impulse
Annual change of primary general government
balance (as a share of GDP) adjusted for cycli-
cal factors. Here, three different identification
procedures were applied - method proposed
by von Hagen (2002), CAPB (cyclically ad-
jusred primary balance) and underlying fiscal
balance (CAPB corrected for one-offs, abrevi-
ated as UB). Positive number of the variable
means narrowing of the deficit, while negative
- its deterioration.
For CAPB, own
calculation based
on AMECO data
for von Hagen
method and UB
Hagen – 165,
CAPB –
146, UB –
144.
art exp
Artifical variable that takes the value of the
impulse variable (as defined above) if the gov-
ernment expenditure change accounts for at
least 50% of the impulse, otherwise it is equal
to 0.
Own calculation
based on AMECO
data
as for
impulse
variable.
art ab ub
Artificial variable that takes the value of the
UB impulse variable if AB and UB methods
identify impulse of the same sign, otherwise
is 0. To be specific, art ab ub has non zero
value in two cases. Firstly, if both AB and
UB record fiscal actions of the same sign and
the absolute value of UB impulse exceeds 0.5%
GDP. Secondly, if according to the AB ap-
proach no fiscal action was taken and the ab-
solute value of UB impulse is lower or equal to
0.5% GDP (thus identyfing cases where both
methods point to no changes in fiscal stance).
Own calculations
based on AMECO
database, OECD,
IMF, EC surveys
and other available
country reports
144
export
Annual growth rate of exports of goods and
services at 2000 constant prices.
AMECO 167
imp eu27
Annual growth of the total of imports of goods
and services in 27 EU countries at 2000 con-
stant prices.
AMECO 160
pinv
Annual growth rate of private investment at
2000 constant prices.
AMECO 166
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pcons
Annual growth rate of private consumption at
2000 constant prices.
AMECO 167
art high
Artifical variable that takes the value of the
impulse variable if the latter is among the 5%
highest adjustments or 5% highest stimuli in
the sample, otherwise the variable is equal to
zero.
Own calculation
based on AMECO
data
as for
impulse
variable.
lab share
Compensation of employees as a percentage of
GDP.
AMECO, with
exeception of years
1995-1999 for
Poland when data
comes from OECD
152
lab product
Anual growth rate of real labour productivity
per person employed.
Eurostat 160
unemp Unemployment rate. AMECO 168
con exp
A balance of consumers confidence indicator
at the end of a year. The balance is calcu-
lated as an average of differences between opti-
mistic and pessimistic answers for 4 questions
concerning consumers expectations about the
future (financial situation, general economic
situation, unemployment and savings).
European
Comission
137
hicp
Annual rate of change of Harmonised Index
of Consumer Prices for years 1997-2011. For
years 1995-1997, because of data scarcity, an-
nual rate of change of Consumer Price Index
(CPI).
Eurostat, World
Bank
170
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7 Tables
Table 1. The Effects of Fiscal Deficit Impulses on GDP Growth
FE RE DK LSDVC
Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB
gdp 1 0.379*** 0.296*** 0.333*** 0.401*** 0.309*** 0.342*** 0.379*** 0.296*** 0.333*** 0.420*** 0.341*** 0.374***
(6.954) (4.889) (5.499) (7.619) (5.301) (5.846) (6.017) (6.222) (6.485) (6.805) (5.094) (6.191)
gdp eu27 1.467*** 1.572*** 1.515*** 1.471*** 1.573*** 1.518*** 1.467*** 1.572*** 1.515*** 1.449*** 1.563*** 1.501***
(10.327) (12.209) (11.481) (10.512) (12.565) (11.878) (6.462) (7.338) (6.616) (9.837) (10.513) (10.583)
impulse -0.067 -0.728*** -0.702* -0.087 -0.725*** -0.788** -0.067 -0.728*** -0.702** -0.04 -0.695*** -0.682**
(-0.329) (-3.641) (-1.971) (-0.446) (-3.887) (-2.392) (-0.256) (-8.960) (-2.712) (-0.195) (-3.783) (-1.981)
impulse 1 0.013 -0.055 0.125 -0.002 -0.037 0.067 0.013 -0.055 0.125 -0.004 0.006 0.162
(0.057) (-0.233) (0.372) (-0.009) (-0.167) (0.212) (0.090) (-0.410) (0.630) (-0.014) (0.025) (0.459)
art exp 0.452** 0.989*** 1.208*** 0.475** 0.981*** 1.203*** 0.452 0.989*** 1.208*** 0.439* 0.972*** 1.237***
(1.989) (3.981) (3.844) (2.175) (4.256) (4.138) (1.011) (8.243) (8.633) (1.777) (4.424) (3.349)
art exp 1 -0.036 0.097 0.122 -0.051 0.068 0.088 -0.036 0.097 0.122 -0.035 0.032 0.064
(-0.145) (0.341) (0.381) (-0.211) (0.255) (0.294) (-0.383) (0.967) (0.929) (-0.130) (0.097) (0.198)
art ab ub -0.281 -0.188 -0.281 -0.292
(-0.751) (-0.552) (-1.216) (-0.858)
art ab ub 1 0.01 0.095 0.01 0.017
(0.029) (0.292) (0.077) (0.045)
constant -0.416 -0.072 -0.109 -0.509 -0.126 -0.176 -0.416 -0.072 -0.109
(-1.015) (-0.181) (-0.269) (-1.266) (-0.329) (-0.451) (-1.397) (-0.367) (-0.505)
N 153 136 134 153 136 134 153 136 134 153 136 134
R2 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.68
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Linear restr:
value 0.362 0.303 0.753 0.335 0.287 0.57 0.362 0.303 0.753 0.36 0.315 0.781
p-value 0.0418 0.1954 0.1834 0.0513 0.1968 0.2215 0.2753 0.2691 0.0001 0.0334 0.189 0.1302
Note. The dependent variable is the annual real growth rate of GDP. Explanatory variables definitions are reported in the Appendix. The
first row of the table lists estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row describes methods used to calculate fiscal
impulses. Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches: Underlying Balance (column UB), von
Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (column CAPB). The linear restriction on parameters being
tested is impulse + impulse 1 + art exp + art exp 1 = 0, field value corresponds to value of the restriction LHS.
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
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Table 2. The Export Channel - the effects of fiscal impulses on export growth
FE RE DK LSDVC
Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB
export 1 -0.125 -0.05 -0.147* -0.097 -0.017 -0.085 -0.125* -0.05 -0.147* -0.079 -0.002 -0.105
(-1.589) (-0.643) (-1.779) (-1.275) (-0.221) (-1.060) (-1.893) (-0.538) (-2.167) (-1.099) (-0.024) (-1.346)
gdp 1 0.084 -0.22 0.012 0.039 -0.267 -0.093 0.084 -0.22 0.012 0.047 -0.278 -0.035
(0.516) (-1.212) (0.065) (0.252) (-1.519) (-0.528) (0.698) (-1.056) (0.084) (0.316) (-1.584) (-0.210)
import eu27 0.937*** 1.112*** 1.029*** 0.928*** 1.108*** 1.048*** 0.937*** 1.112*** 1.029*** 0.931*** 1.104*** 1.025***
(7.738) (10.208) (9.397) (7.791) (10.298) (9.588) (7.773) (14.234) (8.772) (9.303) (9.145) (9.266)
impulse 0.421 -1.112** -1.158 0.53 -0.981** -1.491* 0.421 -1.112** -1.158* 0.39 -1.142** -1.17
(0.794) (-2.204) (-1.322) (1.044) (-2.046) (-1.787) (1.635) (-2.789) (-2.152) (0.791) (-2.438) (-1.376)
impulse 1 -0.618 -1.132* -0.876 -0.628 -1.050* -1.152 -0.618 -1.132** -0.876* -0.695 -1.132* -0.841
(-1.013) (-1.910) (-1.065) (-1.066) (-1.831) (-1.449) (-1.451) (-2.749) (-1.971) (-1.267) (-1.826) (-1.030)
art exp 0.213 1.646*** 2.774*** 0.12 1.474** 2.278*** 0.213 1.646*** 2.774** 0.242 1.665*** 2.735***
(0.355) (2.637) (3.578) (0.210) (2.501) (3.088) (0.401) (6.411) (3.149) (0.343) (3.114) (3.084)
art exp 1 0.848 1.204* 2.401*** 0.868 1.079 1.889** 0.848* 1.204** 2.401*** 0.894 1.171 2.262***
(1.276) (1.684) (2.937) (1.353) (1.577) (2.423) (2.124) (3.097) (5.945) (1.505) (1.445) (2.814)
art ab ub -0.036 0.539 -0.036 -0.035
(-0.039) (0.627) (-0.109) (-0.042)
art ab ub 1 -0.592 0.065 -0.592* -0.587
(-0.666) (0.079) (-2.109) (-0.650)
constant 4.443*** 4.722*** 5.169*** 4.426*** 4.634*** 4.780*** 4.443*** 4.722*** 5.169***
(3.777) (4.433) (4.785) (3.836) (4.423) (4.470) (7.129) (8.415) (7.958)
N 152 136 134 152 136 134 152 136 134 152 136 134
R2 0.4 0.5 0.52 0.4 0.5 0.53 0.4 0.5 0.52 0.4 0.5 0.52
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Linear restr:
value 0.864 0.607 3.141 0.89 0.526 1.524 0.864 0.607 3.1406 0.831 0.562 2.986
p-value 0.062 0.302 0.0293 0.0464 0.3574 0.2029 0.1184 0.4163 0.0006 0.0912 0.3391 0.022
Note. The dependent variable is the annual real growth rate of goods and services export. Explanatory variables definitions are reported in
the Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row describes methods used
to calculate fiscal impulses. Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches: Underlying Balance
(column UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (column CAPB). The linear restriction on
parameters being tested is impulse + impulse 1 + art exp + art exp 1 = 0, field value corresponds to value of the restriction LHS.
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
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Table 3. The effects of fiscal impulses on private investment growth
FE RE DK LSDVC
Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB
pinv 1 0.03 0.035 -0.028 0.087 0.086 0.038 0.03 0.035 -0.028 0.160** 0.179** 0.087
(0.263) (0.303) (-0.234) (0.789) (0.770) (0.328) (0.284) (0.270) (-0.245) (2.207) (2.192) (0.972)
gdp 1 1.130*** 1.102*** 1.310*** 1.006*** 1.000*** 1.149*** 1.130** 1.102** 1.310*** 0.973*** 0.854** 1.129***
(3.221) (2.877) (3.415) (2.982) (2.697) (3.056) (2.338) (2.540) (3.347) (3.796) (2.474) (3.528)
gdp eu27 3.676*** 3.947*** 3.606*** 3.705*** 3.922*** 3.691*** 3.676*** 3.947*** 3.606*** 3.579*** 3.905*** 3.519***
(6.598) (7.451) (6.718) (6.658) (7.532) (6.923) (8.433) (8.945) (6.985) (6.591) (5.539) (5.231)
impulse 1.212 -0.824 -1.093 0.992 -0.872 -1.723 1.212 -0.824*** -1.093 1.444* -0.571 -0.771
(1.450) (-0.987) (-0.735) (1.215) (-1.107) (-1.211) (1.513) (-3.519) (-1.441) (1.720) (-0.659) (-0.464)
impulse 1 1.978** 1.415 2.01 1.554* 1.385 1.398 1.978** 1.415*** 2.01 1.521 1.393 1.948
(2.215) (1.456) (1.471) (1.778) (1.480) (1.066) (2.318) (3.836) (1.117) (1.599) (1.146) (1.212)
art exp -0.072 2.206** 3.913*** 0.12 2.221** 3.485*** -0.072 2.206*** 3.913*** -0.27 2.003* 3.961**
(-0.079) (2.156) (3.065) (0.135) (2.317) (2.880) (-0.045) (3.194) (3.556) (-0.223) (1.909) (2.287)
art exp 1 -2.143** -1.33 0.691 -1.812* -1.397 0.129 -2.143*** -1.330* 0.691 -1.781* -1.507 0.382
(-2.186) (-1.136) (0.529) (-1.888) (-1.252) (0.103) (-3.915) (-2.047) (0.783) (-1.723) (-0.962) (0.251)
art ab ub -0.123 0.736 -0.123 -0.373
(-0.079) (0.504) (-0.098) (-0.233)
art ab ub 1 -2.027 -1.033 -2.027 -1.891
(-1.373) (-0.763) (-1.723) (-1.061)
constant -5.026*** -6.021*** -5.891*** -5.049*** -5.890*** -6.046*** -5.026*** -6.021*** -5.891***
(-2.978) (-3.522) (-3.383) (-3.023) (-3.526) (-3.502) (-4.556) (-6.069) (-7.347)
N 152 136 134 152 136 134 152 136 134 152 136 134
R2 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.47
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Linear restr:
value 0.975 1.467 5.52 0.854 1.337 3.29 0.975 1.466 5.52 0.914 1.318 5.52
p-value 0.1542 0.1288 0.018 0.2046 0.1491 0.0946 0.4968 0.3257 0.0001 0.3068 0.2382 0.0247
Note. The dependent variable is the annual real growth rate of private investment. Explanatory variables definitions are reported in the
Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row describes methods used
to calculate fiscal impulses. Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches: Underlying Balance
(column UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (column CAPB). The linear restriction on
parameters being tested is impulse + impulse 1 + art exp + art exp 1 = 0, field value corresponds to value of the restriction LHS.
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
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Table 4. The effects of fiscal impulses on private consumption growth
FE RE DK LSDVC
Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB
pcons 1 0.137 0.299** 0.196 0.201* 0.368*** 0.291** 0.137 0.299*** 0.196*** 0.138 0.299*** 0.196**
(1.101) (2.134) (1.459) (1.718) (2.768) (2.346) (1.344) (4.039) (3.850) (1.569) (3.480) (2.241)
gdp 1 0.429*** 0.198 0.328** 0.377*** 0.134 0.232 0.429** 0.198** 0.328*** 0.432*** 0.198 0.330**
(2.783) (1.162) (2.010) (2.615) (0.826) (1.529) (2.871) (2.879) (6.395) (4.568) (1.384) (2.319)
gdp eu27 1.513*** 1.583*** 1.571*** 1.504*** 1.575*** 1.572*** 1.513*** 1.583*** 1.571*** 1.522*** 1.583*** 1.574***
(7.544) (8.450) (8.479) (7.637) (8.565) (8.629) (7.524) (6.686) (7.544) (4.624) (4.652) (5.333)
impulse 0.077 0.21 0.854 0.101 0.231 0.637 0.077 0.21 0.854*** 0.074 0.21 0.853
(0.344) (0.696) (1.621) (0.465) (0.781) (1.292) (0.324) (0.943) (4.825) (0.237) (0.433) (1.211)
impulse 1 -0.038 0.121 0.186 -0.028 0.114 0.008 -0.038 0.121 0.186 -0.043 0.121 0.182
(-0.175) (0.392) (0.384) (-0.133) (0.383) (0.018) (-0.146) (0.455) (0.234) (-0.137) (0.232) (0.229)
art high 0.087 -0.481 -0.71 0.046 -0.532 -0.657 0.087 -0.481* -0.710*** 0.091 -0.481 -0.708
(0.312) (-1.242) (-1.592) (0.169) (-1.413) (-1.585) (0.203) (-2.065) (-3.989) (0.219) (-0.688) (-1.073)
art high 1 -0.074 -0.093 -0.154 -0.127 -0.119 -0.149 -0.074 -0.093 -0.154 -0.064 -0.094 -0.152
(-0.280) (-0.248) (-0.347) (-0.492) (-0.326) (-0.357) (-0.287) (-0.425) (-0.313) (-0.178) (-0.128) (-0.208)
art ab ub -0.783 -0.537 -0.783*** -0.786
(-1.449) (-1.085) (-3.537) (-1.073)
art ab ub 1 0.007 0.214 0.007 0.008
(0.012) (0.448) (0.018) (0.010)
constant -1.121* -0.746 -0.749 -1.174** -0.758 -0.848 -1.121*** -0.746** -0.749***
(-1.927) (-1.296) (-1.306) (-2.069) (-1.349) (-1.511) (-3.804) (-2.484) (-3.222)
N 154 126 134 154 126 134 154 126 134 154 126 134
R2 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.56
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note. The dependent variable is the annual real growth rate of private consumption. Explanatory variables definitions are reported in
the Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row describes methods used
to calculate fiscal impulses. Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches: Underlying Balance
(column UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (column CAPB). The linear restriction on
parameters being tested is impulse + impulse 1 + art high + art high 1 = 0, field value corresponds to value of the restriction LHS.
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
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Table 5. The Cost Channel - the effects of fiscal impulses on labour share in GDP
FE RE DK LSDVC
Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB
lab share 1 0.750*** 0.854*** 0.864*** 0.895*** 0.922*** 0.925*** 0.750*** 0.854*** 0.864*** 0.836*** 0.872*** 0.937***
(13.432) (17.569) (17.583) (36.235) (42.595) (42.698) (11.652) (42.056) (41.684) (15.330) (13.144) (18.920)
lab product -0.056 -0.083*** -0.079** 0.002 -0.037 -0.039 -0.056 -0.083*** -0.079*** -0.06 -0.084** -0.072**
(-1.463) (-2.724) (-2.579) (0.050) (-1.236) (-1.288) (-1.603) (-3.642) (-3.396) (-1.369) (-2.097) (-2.398)
unemp -0.181*** -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.170*** -0.166*** -0.156*** -0.181*** -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.208*** -0.231*** -0.246***
(-4.940) (-6.850) (-6.610) (-5.964) (-6.708) (-6.186) (-4.277) (-7.018) (-10.966) (-4.789) (-5.234) (-7.011)
impulse 0.006 0.06 -0.033 0.023 0.003 0.039 0.006 0.06 -0.033 0.02 0.07 -0.004
(0.073) (0.793) (-0.231) (0.264) (0.039) (0.263) (0.303) (0.592) (-0.224) (0.244) (0.625) (-0.020)
impulse 1 0.01 -0.01 -0.101 0.087 -0.058 0.038 0.01 -0.01 -0.101 0.018 -0.003 -0.083
(0.107) (-0.122) (-0.783) (0.863) (-0.694) (0.281) (0.266) (-0.341) (-1.631) (0.165) (-0.028) (-0.532)
art exp -0.157 -0.234** -0.282** -0.216** -0.251** -0.323** -0.157*** -0.234 -0.282* -0.151 -0.242 -0.306**
(-1.503) (-2.205) (-2.251) (-1.991) (-2.271) (-2.465) (-4.551) (-1.662) (-2.276) (-1.388) (-1.482) (-2.109)
art exp 1 -0.091 -0.074 -0.052 -0.167 -0.056 -0.026 -0.091 -0.074* -0.052 -0.08 -0.074 -0.05
(-0.828) (-0.717) (-0.465) (-1.468) (-0.508) (-0.216) (-1.142) (-2.027) (-1.468) (-0.637) (-0.530) (-0.378)
art ab ub 0.114 -0.033 0.114 0.094
(0.801) (-0.225) (1.165) (0.570)
art ab ub 1 0.109 -0.125 0.109* 0.106
(0.778) (-0.922) (1.899) (0.747)
constant 12.592*** 8.677*** 8.222*** 6.084*** 5.008*** 4.807*** 12.592*** 8.677*** 8.222***
(5.503) (4.327) (4.055) (5.124) (4.853) (4.640) (5.055) (9.315) (8.910)
N 136 121 121 136 121 121 136 121 121 136 121 121
R2 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.95
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Linear restr:
value -0.231 -0.257 -0.468 -0.273 -0.362 -0.272 -0.231 -0.257 -0.468 -0.194 -0.248 -0.442
p-value 0.0095 0.0163 0.0245 0.0021 0.0009 0.1618 0.0021 0.0016 0 0.0398 0.0972 0.0554
Note. The dependent variable is the share of employee compensation in GDP. Explanatory variables definitions are reported in the
Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row describes methods used
to calculate fiscal impulses. Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches: Underlying Balance
(column UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (column CAPB). The linear restriction on
parameters being tested is impulse + impulse 1 + art exp + art exp 1 = 0, field value corresponds to value of the restriction LHS.
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
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Table 6. The Expectations Channel - the effects of fiscal impulses on households confi-
dence
FE RE DK LSDVC
Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB Hagen CAPB UB/AB
con exp 1 0.265** 0.229 0.292** 0.448*** 0.453*** 0.407*** 0.265*** 0.229** 0.292** 0.348*** 0.311*** 0.352***
(2.267) (1.652) (2.311) (4.824) (4.314) (3.955) (3.358) (2.590) (2.791) (3.665) (2.659) (3.704)
hicp -0.567** -0.961*** -0.970*** -0.654*** -1.052*** -1.038*** -0.567 -0.961 -0.970* -0.515* -0.924** -0.944***
(-2.246) (-2.767) (-3.004) (-2.700) (-3.382) (-3.611) (-1.592) (-1.753) (-1.927) (-1.666) (-2.346) (-2.645)
unemp 0.275 -0.03 0.156 0.155 0.085 0.066 0.275 -0.03 0.156 0.312 0.043 0.213
(0.698) (-0.062) (0.358) (0.598) (0.283) (0.238) (0.818) (-0.091) (0.822) (0.655) (0.074) (0.435)
gdp 1.445*** 1.232*** 1.058*** 1.055*** 0.919*** 0.904*** 1.445*** 1.232*** 1.058*** 1.408*** 1.178*** 1.017***
(5.181) (4.389) (4.262) (3.910) (3.423) (3.760) (5.837) (6.690) (5.865) (4.514) (4.563) (3.216)
impulse -0.781 -0.935 1.007 -0.355 -0.594 1.519 -0.781 -0.935 1.007 -0.766 -0.942 1.093
(-1.260) (-1.117) (0.711) (-0.563) (-0.715) (1.104) (-1.116) (-1.210) (1.716) (-1.058) (-0.948) (0.598)
impulse 1 0.18 -0.309 2.209 0.228 -0.104 2.772** 0.18 -0.309 2.209 0.154 -0.312 2.206
(0.295) (-0.345) (1.611) (0.366) (-0.116) (2.098) (0.414) (-0.384) (1.395) (0.197) (-0.329) (1.231)
art high -0.569 0.864 1.842 -0.567 0.538 1.957* -0.569 0.864 1.842*** -0.645 0.834 1.798
(-0.711) (0.809) (1.495) (-0.698) (0.504) (1.704) (-1.197) (1.814) (4.753) (-0.652) (0.638) (0.967)
art high 1 -1.29 0.208 -1.986* -0.993 0.331 -1.734 -1.290*** 0.208 -1.986* -1.339 0.236 -2.036
(-1.619) (0.181) (-1.664) (-1.240) (0.286) (-1.525) (-3.730) (0.235) (-2.192) (-1.317) (0.151) (-1.293)
art ab ub -3.204** -3.594*** -3.204*** -3.271
(-2.240) (-2.622) (-5.959) (-1.551)
art ab ub 1 -0.433 -1.15 -0.433 -0.38
(-0.299) (-0.834) (-0.443) (-0.196)
constant -22.965*** -18.269*** -17.032*** -15.511*** -12.598*** -12.382*** -22.965*** -18.269*** -17.032***
(-5.706) (-3.648) (-3.732) (-4.774) (-3.327) (-3.611) (-6.835) (-4.902) (-6.584)
N 123 110 115 123 110 115 123 110 115 123 110 115
R2 0.48 0.48 0.56 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.49 0.55 0.55
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Linear restr:
value -2.46 -0.171 3.071 -1.686 0.171 4.515 -2.57 -0.171 3.072 -0.171 -0.183 3.061
p-value 0.0037 0.874 0.1417 0.033 0.874 0.0121 0.0444 0.7918 0.018 0.8763 0.8931 0.2558
Note. The dependent variable is the balance of consumers confidence indicatort the end of a year. Explanatory variables definitions
are reported in the Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row
describes methods used to calculate fiscal impulses. Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches:
Underlying Balance (column UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (column CAPB). The
linear restriction on parameters being tested is impulse + impulse 1 + art high + art high 1 = 0, field value corresponds to value of the
restriction LHS.
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
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